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P2 HuffDuff: Stealing Pruned DNNs from Sparse Accelerators

HuffDuff:从稀疏加速器窃取剪枝 DNN
ASPLOS Proceedings of the 28th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 22023匹配度 1/10 · 论文研究的是稀疏加速器上剪枝 DNN 的侧信道模型窃取攻击,属于硬件安全与模型隐私方向,不涉及静态分析、浮点/贝叶斯程序分析,也不涉及 LLM/Agent 与程序语言的交叉。引用 10 inbox
Dingqing Yang, Prashant J. Nair, Mieszko Lis
crossref: 2026-09-12

AI 速览

一句话:提出针对稀疏加速器上剪枝 DNN 的侧信道模型窃取攻击,将基于片外访存量的攻击扩展到剪枝模型。

深度神经网络模型常作为专有资产部署在边缘设备上,攻击者若具备物理访问能力,可利用片外内存访问量等侧信道推断模型信息。已有工作通过将数据传输量与层几何结构相关联,成功从边缘设备窃取稠密 DNN。本文(HuffDuff)进一步面向剪枝后的 DNN 与稀疏加速器,研究稀疏化带来的新侧信道风险,目标是从低功耗稀疏加速器中窃取剪枝模型。标题表明攻击利用了剪枝/稀疏结构在访存行为上的特征;摘要未详述具体方法、实验平台与成功率,但将模型窃取威胁从稠密场景扩展到更现实、更高效的稀疏推理部署场景。

问题
边缘设备上的专有 DNN 易受物理侧信道攻击;现有攻击已能从片外访存量窃取稠密模型,本文关注剪枝模型在稀疏加速器上的同类威胁。
方法
摘要未给出具体方法;标题表明提出 HuffDuff 攻击,利用稀疏/剪枝模型在加速器访存行为中的特征来窃取模型。
评估
摘要未报告评估细节;仅指出先前工作已验证访存侧信道可用于稠密 DNN 窃取。
原文摘要(Abstract)

Deep learning models are a valuable “secret sauce” that confers a significant competitive advantage. Many models are never visible to the user and even publicly known state-of-the-art models are either completely proprietary or only accessible via access-controlled APIs. Increasingly, these models run directly on the edge, often using a low-power DNN accelerator. This makes models particularly vulnerable, as an attacker with physical access can exploit side channels like off-chip memory access volumes. Indeed, prior work has shown that this channel can be used to steal dense DNNs from edge devices by correlating data transfer volumes with layer geometry.

链接与引用

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BibTeX
@inproceedings{paperbot10028,
  title = {HuffDuff: Stealing Pruned DNNs from Sparse Accelerators},
  author = {Dingqing Yang and Prashant J. Nair and Mieszko Lis},
  booktitle = {ASPLOS},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1145/3575693.3575738}
}