一句话：提出面向 FHE 加速器的轻量弹性保护框架，以极低开销抵御硬件故障导致的密文损坏。
全同态加密（FHE）计算复杂度极高，催生了多种加速器设计，但现有 FHE 加速器通常默认所有计算可靠执行，忽视现代 FHE 方案对硬件故障高度敏感：密文中单比特错误即可扩散为大规模明文损坏。本文提出 ReliaFHE，一个面向 FHE 加速器的弹性框架，同时集成存储与计算保护。它利用 FHE 密文多项式规模大的特点，采用轻量级校验和方案构造高效码字，并针对数论变换、基转换和逐元素运算三大算术内核进行定制。评估表明，ReliaFHE 在基本操作层面将可靠性提升超过 104，性能开销约 1.5% 或面积开销约 1.9%，奇偶校验存储开销低于 1%。
The significant computational complexity of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) has prompted numerous accelerator designs. However, existing FHE accelerators often implicitly assume that all computations are executed reliably, overlooking the fact that modern FHE schemes can be highly vulnerable to hardware faults: even a single-bit error in a ciphertext can cascade into widespread plaintext corruption. In this paper, we present ReliaFHE, a resilient framework that integrates both storage- and computation-oriented protection for FHE accelerators. It leverages the large ciphertext polynomials inherent in FHE and employs lightweight, checksum-based schemes to construct efficient codewords. ReliaFHE is tailored to the three dominant arithmetic kernels: number theoretic transform, base conversion, and element-wise operations. Our evaluation shows that ReliaFHE improves reliability by more than 104 (in terms of primitive operations), with either ~1.5% performance overhead or ~1.9% area overhead. The parity storage overhead is below 1%.
@inproceedings{LiKZZL026,
title = {ReliaFHE: Resilient Design for Fully Homomorphic Encryption Accelerators},
author = {Fan Li and Mayank Kumar and Ruizhi Zhu and Mengxin Zheng and Qian Lou and Xin Xin},
booktitle = {ASPLOS},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1145/3779212.3790211}
}