一句话：提出 SAFA，通过工件森林分析比较系统版本，定位安全案例受影响区域并给出更新建议，以支持安全案例的演化与复用。
安全保证案例（SAC）用分层的声明、论证和证据来结构化地论证系统安全性，但随着系统演化与规模增长，SAC 难以维护。本文采用设计科学方法，提出 Safety Artifact Forest Analysis（SAFA），利用 traceability 自动比较先前已批准或认证版本与新版本的软件工件，识别受变更影响的 SAC 区域，并在 Delta Tree 中可视化与解释变化，进而给出对 SAC 及其底层工件和追踪链的更新建议。作者在 Dronology（协同小型无人机监控与协调系统）上评估该方法，并通过用户研究表明 SAFA 能帮助用户识别可能影响系统安全性的变更，为 SAC 的维护与演化提供有用信息。
Safety Assurance Cases (SACs) are increasingly used to guide and evaluate the safety of software-intensive systems. They are used to construct a hierarchically organized set of claims, arguments, and evidence in order to provide a structured argument that a system is safe for use. However, as the system evolves and grows in size, a SAC can be difficult to maintain. In this paper we utilize design science to develop a novel solution for identifying areas of a SAC that are affected by changes to the system. Moreover, we generate actionable recommendations for updating the SAC, including its underlying artifacts and trace links, in order to evolve an existing safety case for use in a new version of the system. Our approach, Safety Artifact Forest Analysis (SAFA), leverages traceability to automatically compare software artifacts from a previously approved or certified version with a new version of the system. We identify, visualize, and explain changes in a Delta Tree. We evaluate our approach using the Dronology system for monitoring and coordinating the actions of cooperating, small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Results from a user study show that SAFA helped users to identify changes that potentially impacted system safety and provided information that could be used to help maintain and evolve a SAC.
@inproceedings{AgrawalKVRCL19,
title = {Leveraging Artifact Trees to Evolve and Reuse Safety Cases},
author = {Ankit Agrawal and Seyedehzahra Khoshmanesh and Michael Vierhauser and Mona Rahimi and Jane Cleland-Huang and Robyn Lutz},
booktitle = {ICSE},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1109/icse.2019.00124}
}