一句话：提出核外强制、与核心无关的 TEE 架构 TeeM³，支持异构系统上可互通的 TEE 组，并大幅缩小 TCB。
现有 TEE 方案多面向 CPU 并绑定特定指令集架构，加速器各自实现 TEE 会在同一系统中产生多个互不相同的 TEE，推高复杂度与可信计算基（TCB），也使跨异构单元的 TEE 安全通信变得困难。TeeM³ 基于 M³ 提出核外强制（out-of-core enforcement）的可信执行架构：OS 侧加入远程认证信任根（RoT）与类 unikernel 的 TEE 库，硬件侧加入两种轻量隔离机制以分别保护 TEE 与 RoT，并继承并加固 M³ 的统一通信通道，从而支持互相通信的 TEE 组。评估表明其性能开销低、额外硬件成本适中，硬件 TCB 缩小 1.8 倍、软件 TCB 缩小 3.42 倍。
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) enable secure code execution on machines that are not fully trusted by the user who runs the workload. However, existing TEE solutions mostly target CPUs and are typically tied to one specific instruction set architecture. Although some accelerators also provide support for TEEs, this leads to multiple, different TEE implementations on the same system, increasing its complexity and trusted computing base (TCB). This challenge becomes particularly apparent when workloads span heterogeneous processing units, because the diversity of TEE implementations complicates the creation of secure communication channels between the individual TEEs. In this paper, we present TeeM³, a trusted execution architecture with discrete, out-of-core enforcement, which is core-independent and better-suited to heterogeneous systems than existing approaches. We build upon M³ and extend both the hardware platform and operating system (OS). On the OS side, we add a root of trust (RoT) for remote attestation and a unikernel-like library for TEEs. On the hardware side, we add two lightweight isolation mechanisms to protect both TEEs and the RoT from other components in the system. Furthermore, TeeM³ inherits uniform communication channels from M³ and protects them to support communicating groups of TEEs. We show in the evaluation that our approach has low performance overhead, modest additional hardware costs, and reduces the hardware TCB by a factor of 1.8 and the software TCB by a factor of 3.42.
@inproceedings{AsmussenHWGGPDR26,
title = {T
<scp>EE</scp>
M³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution Environments},
author = {Nils Asmussen and Sebastian Haas and Carsten Weinhold and Nicholas Gordon and Stephan Gerhold and Friedrich Pauls and Nilanjana Das and Michael Roitzsch},
booktitle = {ASPLOS},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1145/3779212.3790232}
}