Capability machines are a special form of CPUs that offer fine-grained privilege separation using a form of authority-carrying values known as capabilities. The CHERI capability machine offers local capabilities, which could be used as a cheap but restricted form of capability revocation. Unfortunately, local capability revocation is unrealistic in practice because large amounts of stack memory need to be cleared as a security precaution. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by introducing uninitialized capabilities : a new form of capabilities that represent read/write authority to a block of memory without exposing the memory’s initial contents. We provide a mechanically verified program logic for reasoning about programs on a capability machine with the new feature and we formalize and prove capability safety in the form of a universal contract for untrusted code. We use uninitialized capabilities for making a previously-proposed secure calling convention efficient and prove its security using the program logic. Finally, we report on a proof-of-concept implementation of uninitialized capabilities on the CHERI capability machine.

@article{paperbot1162,
  title = {Efficient and provable local capability revocation using uninitialized capabilities},
  author = {Aïna Linn Georges and Armaël Guéneau and Thomas Van Strydonck and Amin Timany and Alix Trieu and Sander Huyghebaert and Dominique Devriese and Lars Birkedal},
  journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages},
  volume = {5},
  number = {POPL},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1145/3434287}
}