Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms such as privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that break, or at least significantly weaken, the isolation that these mechanisms offer. Extending a processor with new architectural or micro-architectural features brings a risk of introducing new software-based side-channel attacks. This article studies the problem of extending a processor with new features without weakening the security of the isolation mechanisms that the processor offers. Our solution is heavily based on techniques from research on programming languages. More specifically, we propose to use the programming language concept of full abstraction as a general formal criterion for the security of a processor extension. We instantiate the proposed criterion to the concrete case of extending a microprocessor that supports enclaved execution with secure interruptibility. This is a very relevant instantiation, as several recent papers have shown that interruptibility of enclaves leads to a variety of software-based side-channel attacks. We propose a design for interruptible enclaves and prove that it satisfies our security criterion. We also implement the design on an open-source enclave-enabled microprocessor and evaluate the cost of our design in terms of performance and hardware size.

@article{paperbot1215,
  title = {Securing Interruptible Enclaved Execution on Small Microprocessors},
  author = {Matteo Busi and Job Noorman and Jo Van Bulck and Letterio Galletta and Pierpaolo Degano and Jan Tobias Mühlberg and Frank Piessens},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems},
  volume = {43},
  number = {3},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1145/3470534}
}