Compilers often weaken or even discard software-based countermeasures commonly used to protect programs against side-channel attacks; worse, they may also introduce vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. The solution to this problemis to develop compilers that preserve such countermeasures. Prior work establishes that (a mildly modified version of) the CompCert and Jasmin formally verified compilers preserve constant-time, an information flow policy that ensures that programs are protected against timing side-channel attacks. However, nothing is known about preservation of speculative constant-time, a strengthening of the constant-time policythat ensures that programs are protected against Spectre-v1 attacks. We first show that preservation of speculative constant-time fails in practice by providing examples of secure programs whose compilation is not speculative constant-time using GCC (GCC -O0 and GCC -O1) and Jasmin. Then, we define a proof-of-concept compiler that distills some of the critical passes of the Jasmin compiler and use the C oq proof assistant to prove that it preserves speculative constant-time. Finally, we patch the Jasmin speculative constant-time type checker and demonstrate that all cryptographic implementations written in Jasmin can be fixed with minimal impact.

@article{paperbot3272,
  title = {Preservation of Speculative Constant-Time by Compilation},
  author = {Santiago Arranz Olmos and Gilles Barthe and Lionel Blatter and Benjamin Grégoire and Vincent Laporte},
  journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages},
  volume = {9},
  number = {POPL},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1145/3704880}
}