Selecting the combination of security controls that will most effectively protect a system's assets is a difficult task. If the wrong controls are selected, the system may be left vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical data and services. In practical settings, as standardized control catalogues can be quite large, it is not possible to select and implement every control possible. Instead, considerations, such as budget, effectiveness, and dependencies among various controls, must be considered to choose a combination of security controls that best achieve a set of system security objectives. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach for selecting effective combinations of security controls based on expected attacker profiles and a set budget. The control selection problem is set up as a two-person zero-sum one-shot game. Valid control combinations for selection are generated using an algebraic formalism to account for dependencies among selected controls. Using a software tool, we apply the approach on a fictional Canadian military system with Canada's standardized control catalogue, ITSG-33. Through this case study, we demonstrate the approach's scalability to assist in selecting an effective set of security controls for large systems. The results illustrate how a security analyst can use the proposed approach and supporting tool to guide and support decision-making in the control selection activity when developing secure systems of all sizes.

@article{abs-2503-15626,
  title = {A Scalable Game-Theoretic Approach for Selecting Security Controls from Standardized Catalogues},
  author = {Dylan Léveillé and Jason Jaskolka},
  journal = {Logical Methods in Computer Science},
  volume = {Volume 22, Issue 2},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.46298/lmcs-22(2:7)2026}
}