Information-flow security is important to the safety and privacy of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) across many domains: information leakage can both violate user privacy and reveal vulnerabilities to physical attacks. CPSs face the challenge that information can flow both in discrete cyber channels and in continuous real-valued physical channels ranging from time to motion to electrical currents. We call these hybrid-dynamic information flows (HDIFs) and introduce dHL, the first logic for verifying HDIFs in hybrid-dynamical models of CPSs. Our logic extends differential dynamic logic (dL) for hybrid-dynamical systems with hybrid-logical features for explicit program state representation, supporting relational reasoning used for information flow arguments. By verifying HDIFs, we ensure security even under a strong attacker model wherein an attacker can observe time and physical values continuously. We present a Hilbert-style proof calculus for dHL, prove it sound, and compare the expressive power of dHL with dL. We develop a hybrid system model based on the smart electrical grid FREEDM, with which we showcase dHL. We prove that the naive model has a previously unknown information flow vulnerability, which we verify is resolved in a revised model. This is the first information flow proof both for HDIFs and for a hybrid-dynamical model in general.

@inproceedings{paperbot4346,
  title = {A Hybrid, Dynamic Logic for Hybrid-Dynamic Information Flow},
  author = {Rose Bohrer and André Platzer},
  booktitle = {LICS},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1145/3209108.3209151}
}