Memory corruption vulnerabilities can occur in multithreaded executions, known as concurrency vulnerabilities in this paper. Due to non-deterministic multithreaded executions, they are extremely difficult to detect. Recently, researchers tried to apply data race detectors to detect concurrency vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, these detectors are ineffective on detecting concurrency vulnerabilities. For example, most (90%) of data races are benign. However, concurrency vulnerabilities are harmful and can usually be exploited to launch attacks. Techniques based on maximal causal model rely on constraints solvers to predict scheduling; they can miss concurrency vulnerabilities in practice. Our insight is, a concurrency vulnerability is more related to the orders of events that can be reversed in different executions, no matter whether the corresponding accesses can form data races. We then define exchangeable events to identify pairs of events such that their execution orders can be probably reversed in different executions. We further propose algorithms to detect three major kinds of concurrency vulnerabilities. To overcome potential imprecision of exchangeable events, we also adopt a validation to isolate real vulnerabilities. We implemented our algorithms as a tool ConVul and applied it on 10 known concurrency vulnerabilities and the MySQL database server. Compared with three widely-used race detectors and one detector based on maximal causal model, ConVul was significantly more effective by detecting 9 of 10 known vulnerabilities and 6 zero-day vulnerabilities on MySQL (four have been confirmed). However, other detectors only detected at most 3 out of the 16 known and zero-day vulnerabilities.

@inproceedings{paperbot5139,
  title = {Detecting concurrency memory corruption vulnerabilities},
  author = {Yan Cai and Biyun Zhu and Ruijie Meng and Hao Yun and Liang He and Purui Su and Bin Liang},
  booktitle = {FSE},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1145/3338906.3338927}
}