一句话：提出 Streamline，一种无需 flush 指令、通过发送方与接收方异步合谋实现的高速缓存隐蔽信道攻击协议。
缓存隐蔽信道利用处理器缓存等共享硬件资源的竞争，在系统中相互合谋的进程间传递信息。近年基于缓存行 flush 指令的 Flush+Reload、Flush+Flush 等成为最快的跨核攻击，但它们要求 flush 指令，并且发送方与接收方必须在每个比特周期紧密同步以维持低错误率，这限制了适用场景与比特率。论文提出 Streamline，一种快速、无 flush 的缓存隐蔽信道攻击，通过实现异步合谋来解除上述协议约束。标题与摘要强调，现有攻击的局限并非源于根本硬件限制，而是协议设计；Streamline 试图在无需 flush 和无需逐比特同步的情况下保持高速隐蔽通信。摘要未报告具体评估结果。
Covert-channel attacks exploit contention on shared hardware resources such as processor caches to transmit information between colluding processes on the same system. In recent years, covert channels leveraging cacheline-flush instructions, such as Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush, have emerged as the fastest cross-core attacks. However, current attacks are limited in their applicability and bit-rate not due to any fundamental hardware limitations, but due to their protocol design requiring flush instructions and tight synchronization between sender and receiver, where both processes synchronize every bit-period to maintain low error-rates.
DOI 原文 ·
@inproceedings{paperbot6124,
title = {Streamline: a fast, flushless cache covert-channel attack by enabling asynchronous collusion},
author = {Gururaj Saileshwar and Christopher W. Fletcher and Moinuddin Qureshi},
booktitle = {ASPLOS},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1145/3445814.3446742}
}