一句话：提出 QFuzz，用定量模糊测试检测和评估侧信道，放宽非干扰以容忍微小泄漏并提升可扩展性。
侧信道会泄露软件机密信息，其源于执行时间等非功能属性且需跨多条执行轨迹推理，因而难以检测和评估。现有工作将非干扰（noninterference）引入静态分析、符号执行和灰盒模糊测试，但非干扰过于严格，即使泄漏强度很弱也可能被判为不安全。定量安全概念可放宽非干扰并容忍微小泄漏，但已有定量方法存在实际可扩展性限制。本文提出 QFuzz——面向侧信道的定量模糊测试方法，旨在结合模糊测试与定量分析，在可扩展检测侧信道的同时量化泄漏。摘要未给出具体实现与实验结论。
Side channels pose a significant threat to the confidentiality of software systems. Such vulnerabilities are challenging to detect and evaluate because they arise from non-functional properties of software such as execution times and require reasoning on multiple execution traces. Recently, noninterference notions have been adapted in static analysis, symbolic execution, and greybox fuzzing techniques. However, noninterference is a strict notion and may reject security even if the strength of information leaks are weak. A quantitative notion of security allows for the relaxation of noninterference and tolerates small (unavoidable) leaks. Despite progress in recent years, the existing quantitative approaches have scalability limitations in practice.