一句话:通过扎根理论分析1444份CVE/CWE漏洞报告,构建含254个新组件的软件攻击面分类模型。
该论文针对攻击面组件缺乏全面、统一清单的问题,指出现有研究多基于项目特定假设或攻击面近似,难以系统指导脆弱性分析。作者采用扎根理论(Grounded Theory)定性方法,由三名开发与安全专家对来自CVE和CWE的1444份漏洞报告与弱点进行编码分析,围绕攻击来源、攻击目标及攻击方式提出Entry points、Targets和Mechanisms三个核心类别,并据此提取和归类攻击面概念。研究共识别出254个文献中未曾出现的攻击面组件;与已有工作对比发现,已识别的代码层攻击面组件中仅6.7%曾被研究过。该分类为漏洞分析与安全风险评估提供了更全面的攻击面刻画基础。
The notion of Attack Surface refers to the critical points on the boundary of a software system which are accessible from outside or contain valuable content for attackers. The ability to identify attack surface components of software system has a significant role in effectiveness of vulnerability analysis approaches. Most prior works focus on vulnerability techniques that use an approximation of attack surfaces and there have not been many attempts to create a comprehensive list of attack surface components. Although limited number of studies have focused on attack surface analysis, they defined attack surface components based on project specific hypotheses to evaluate security risk of specific types of software applications. In this study, we leverage a qualitative analysis approach to empirically identify an extensive list of attack surface components. To this end, we conduct a Grounded Theory (GT) analysis on 1444 previously published vulnerability reports and weaknesses with a team of three software developers and security experts. We extract vulnerability information from two publicly available repositories: 1) Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and 2) Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). We ask three key questions: where the attacks come from, what they target, and how they emerge, and to help answer these questions we define three core categories for attack surface components: Entry points, Targets, and Mechanisms. We extract attack surface concepts related to each category from collected vulnerability information using the GT analysis and provide a comprehensive categorization that represents attack surface components of software systems from various perspectives. The paper introduces 254 new attack surface components that did not exist in the literature. The comparison of the proposed attack surface model with prior works indicates that only 6.7% of the identified Code level attack surface components are studied before.