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P2 Detecting Vulnerabilities in Linux-Based Embedded Firmware with SSE-Based On-Demand Alias Analysis

基于SSE按需别名分析的Linux嵌入式固件漏洞检测
ISSTA Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis2023匹配度 3/10 · 该论文属于传统静态污点分析在嵌入式固件安全中的应用,虽然涉及程序分析与抽象解释,但未与LLM/Agent、机器学习系统、浮点程序分析或贝叶斯程序分析等用户核心方向交叉,因此匹配度较低。引用 39 inbox
Kai Cheng, Yaowen Zheng, Tao Liu, Le Guan, Peng Liu, Hong Li, Hongsong Zhu, Kejiang Ye, Limin Sun
crossref: 2026-09-12dblp: 2026-09-12

AI 速览

一句话:提出EmTaint,用结构化符号表达式按需别名分析提升嵌入式固件污点漏洞检测的准确率和速度。

该论文关注Linux嵌入式固件中污点式漏洞的静态检测。现有方法难以处理从攻击者可控源到安全敏感汇路径上的间接调用,造成大量漏报;同时中间污点源识别依赖启发式,精度不足,导致误报偏高。为此,作者提出EmTaint,首先设计基于结构化符号表达式(SSE)的按需别名分析技术,并在此基础上实现间接调用解析与精确污点分析,结合净化规则检查,从而在有限时间内准确发现大量污点式漏洞。作者在来自六家流行厂商的35个真实嵌入式固件样本上评估EmTaint,发现至少192个漏洞,其中41个n-day、151个0-day;截至写作时,已有至少115个CVE/PSV编号被分配。与KARONTE、SaTC等先进工具相比,EmTaint在同一数据集上用时更少且发现漏洞显著更多。

问题
Linux嵌入式固件静态污点分析难以处理源到汇路径上的间接调用,且中间污点源识别启发式不准确,导致漏报与误报偏高。
方法
设计基于结构化符号表达式(SSE)的按需别名分析,并结合间接调用解析、精确污点分析与净化规则检查,实现EmTaint。
评估
在六家厂商35个真实固件样本上评估,发现至少192个漏洞(41个n-day、151个0-day),已有至少115个CVE/PSV;相比KARONTE和SaTC在同数据集上发现更多漏洞且耗时更少。
原文摘要(Abstract)

Although the importance of using static taint analysis to detect taint-style vulnerabilities in Linux-based embedded firmware is widely recognized, existing approaches are plagued by following major limitations: (a) Existing works cannot properly handle indirect call on the path from attacker-controlled sources to security-sensitive sinks, resulting in lots of false negatives. (b) They employ heuristics to identify mediate taint source and it is not accurate enough, which leads to high false positives. To address issues, we propose EmTaint, a novel static approach for accurate and fast detection of taint-style vulnerabilities in Linux-based embedded firmware. In EmTaint, we first design a structured symbolic expression-based (SSE-based) on-demand alias analysis technique. Based on it, we come up with indirect call resolution and accurate taint analysis scheme. Combined with sanitization rule checking, EmTaint can eventually discovers a large number of taint-style vulnerabilities accurately within a limited time. We evaluated EmTaint against 35 real-world embedded firmware samples from six popular vendors. The result shows EmTaint discovered at least 192 vulnerabilities, including 41 n-day vulnerabilities and 151 0-day vulnerabilities. At least 115 CVE/PSV numbers have been allocated from a subset of the reported vulnerabilities at the time of writing. Compared with state-of-the-art tools such as KARONTE and SaTC, EmTaint found significantly more vulnerabilities on the same dataset in less time.

链接与引用

DOI 原文 · PDF(开放获取) · DBLP

BibTeX
@inproceedings{ChengZLG0LZYS23,
  title = {Detecting Vulnerabilities in Linux-Based Embedded Firmware with SSE-Based On-Demand Alias Analysis},
  author = {Kai Cheng and Yaowen Zheng and Tao Liu and Le Guan and Peng Liu and Hong Li and Hongsong Zhu and Kejiang Ye and Limin Sun},
  booktitle = {ISSTA},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1145/3597926.3598062}
}