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P2 Who's Pushing the Code? An Exploration of GitHub Impersonation

谁在推送代码?GitHub 身份冒充现象初探
ICSE 2025 IEEE/ACM 47th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)2025匹配度 2/10 · 论文研究 GitHub 身份冒充的认知、检测与缓解,属于软件工程/开源安全与开发者行为方向,与用户关注的 PL→AI、AI→PL、静态分析、浮点程序分析、贝叶斯程序分析及 LLM/Agent 改进分析等核心问题没有直接交叉。虽然涉及 GitHub 与提交历史,但未讨论程序分析、形式化验证或 LLM/Agent 工具链。引用 1 inbox
Yueke Zhang, Anda Liang, Xiaohan Wang, Pamela Wisniewski, Fengwei Zhang, Kevin Leach, Yu Huang
crossref: 2026-09-12

AI 速览

一句话:首次通过访谈与1250万提交数据揭示GitHub身份冒充的认知、检测与缓解现状。

该论文首次探索 GitHub 开源社区中的身份冒充问题。作者对 17 位真实开源贡献者进行结构化访谈,了解其对冒充行为的认知与缓解措施;通过在访谈中展示冒充演示,发现用户此前普遍低估该问题的严重性,事后则表现出显著担忧。研究还表明,现有最佳实践(提交签名)需改进以促进采用。作者收集 1250 万条提交数据考察现状,发现当前冒充难以被检测,且提交历史常将冒充行为与 pull request 事件同等对待,导致检测方法缺失。最后讨论参与者对潜在缓解方案的看法。

问题
研究 GitHub 开源社区中身份冒充的影响,包括开发者认知、现有缓解措施和实际检测现状。
方法
对 17 名开源贡献者进行结构化访谈(含冒充演示),并收集 1250 万条提交数据进行实证分析。
评估
通过访谈主题分析揭示认知不足与提交签名局限,并通过提交数据说明当前冒充难以检测、缺乏专门检测方法。
原文摘要(Abstract)

GitHub is one of the largest open-source software (OSS) communities for software development and collaboration. Impersonation in the OSS communities refers to the malicious act of assuming another user's identity, often aiming to gain unauthorized access to code, manipulate project outcomes, or spread misinformation. With several recent real-world attacks resulting from impersonation, this issue is becoming more and more concerning within the OSS community. We present the first exploration of the impact of impersonation in GitHub. Specifically, we conduct structured interviews with 17 real-world OSS contributors about their perception of impersonation and corresponding mitigations. Our study reveals that, in general, GitHub users lack awareness of impersonation and underestimate the severity of its implications. After witnessing a demo of impersonation, they show significant concern for the OSS community. Meanwhile, we also demonstrate that the current best practices (i.e., commit signing) that might mitigate impersonation must be improved to encourage use and adoption. We also present and discuss participant perceptions of potential ways to mitigate GitHub impersonation. We collect a dataset comprising 12.5 million commits to investigate the current status of impersonation. Interestingly, we find out that currently impersonation cannot be easily detected. We observe that existing commit histories treat impersonation behavior identically to pull request events, resulting in a lack of detection methods for impersonation.

链接与引用

DOI 原文 · PDF(开放获取) ·

BibTeX
@inproceedings{paperbot8770,
  title = {Who's Pushing the Code? An Exploration of GitHub Impersonation},
  author = {Yueke Zhang and Anda Liang and Xiaohan Wang and Pamela Wisniewski and Fengwei Zhang and Kevin Leach and Yu Huang},
  booktitle = {ICSE},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1109/icse55347.2025.00065}
}