一句话:首次通过访谈与1250万提交数据揭示GitHub身份冒充的认知、检测与缓解现状。
该论文首次探索 GitHub 开源社区中的身份冒充问题。作者对 17 位真实开源贡献者进行结构化访谈,了解其对冒充行为的认知与缓解措施;通过在访谈中展示冒充演示,发现用户此前普遍低估该问题的严重性,事后则表现出显著担忧。研究还表明,现有最佳实践(提交签名)需改进以促进采用。作者收集 1250 万条提交数据考察现状,发现当前冒充难以被检测,且提交历史常将冒充行为与 pull request 事件同等对待,导致检测方法缺失。最后讨论参与者对潜在缓解方案的看法。
GitHub is one of the largest open-source software (OSS) communities for software development and collaboration. Impersonation in the OSS communities refers to the malicious act of assuming another user's identity, often aiming to gain unauthorized access to code, manipulate project outcomes, or spread misinformation. With several recent real-world attacks resulting from impersonation, this issue is becoming more and more concerning within the OSS community. We present the first exploration of the impact of impersonation in GitHub. Specifically, we conduct structured interviews with 17 real-world OSS contributors about their perception of impersonation and corresponding mitigations. Our study reveals that, in general, GitHub users lack awareness of impersonation and underestimate the severity of its implications. After witnessing a demo of impersonation, they show significant concern for the OSS community. Meanwhile, we also demonstrate that the current best practices (i.e., commit signing) that might mitigate impersonation must be improved to encourage use and adoption. We also present and discuss participant perceptions of potential ways to mitigate GitHub impersonation. We collect a dataset comprising 12.5 million commits to investigate the current status of impersonation. Interestingly, we find out that currently impersonation cannot be easily detected. We observe that existing commit histories treat impersonation behavior identically to pull request events, resulting in a lack of detection methods for impersonation.
@inproceedings{paperbot8770,
title = {Who's Pushing the Code? An Exploration of GitHub Impersonation},
author = {Yueke Zhang and Anda Liang and Xiaohan Wang and Pamela Wisniewski and Fengwei Zhang and Kevin Leach and Yu Huang},
booktitle = {ICSE},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1109/icse55347.2025.00065}
}